Bahrain: Civil society and Political Imagination By Jane Kinninmont and Omar Sirri

The following summary of the recent Chatham House (Royal Institute for International Affairs) paper on Bahrain was prepared by the NCF team. This summary attempts to reflect views expressed in that paper (but is not an exact précis of that paper) and does not represent an NCF position.

This paper looks at the continuing crisis in Bahrain which predates the 2011 demonstrations. This crisis is deepening sectarian tensions and damaging the Kingdom’s economy. This in turn is hampering investment, deterring expatriate talent and causing a brain drain whereby Shi’a Bahrainis and even Sunni Bahrainis are moving abroad to seek better economic opportunities.

Despite Crown Prince Sheikh Salman al-Khalifa’s attempts to encourage the opposition to participate in the 2014 elections by saying that Parliament would discuss five areas of possible reform, the opposition has decided against standing. However, the Crown Prince’s proposal did not guarantee reforms and some critical issues were not addressed. If institutions fail to create space for conflict resolution then tensions will play out in the streets.

The main reason behind the 2011 demonstrations was the failure of the limited reforms after 2001 to satisfy Bahrain’s diverse political constituencies. Since 2011 there have been various failed attempts at dialogue. These talks are tightly controlled by the authorities leading to opposition complaints that they are rigged. This has led to political and social polarisation in Bahrain and increased the risk of further radicalisation of the country’s opposition.

Another issue is Bahraini citizenship; the government has naturalised some 90,000 people since 1999.[1] [2]

Civil society operates under significant restrictions. An elected municipal council of Manama which was established in the 1920s and the Shi’a Ulema Council (a council of Shi’a clerics) were dissolved this year. Many civil society groups and opposition activists are accused of acting as agents for foreign powers, primarily Iran, despite claims from the opposition saying they are driven by national aims and not by a desire to create an Iranian style Islamic nation in Bahrain.

New laws on ‘insulting the king’ have discouraged the country’s moderate and independent voices from middle class families who feel they have lots to lose from participating in constructive debates for fear of insulting the monarchy.

Between January and August 2014, there were a series of back-channel discussions involving the Crown Prince, the royal court and several opposition groups including al-Wefaq in hopes of avoiding another boycott by al-Wefaq. In September 2014, the Crown Prince announced a new five-point framework for dialogue. These main points were:

1. Electoral Districts - a commitment to redefining electoral districts to ensure fairer representation and measures to enhance electoral oversight
2. Legislative Authority – revising the appointment process for the Shura Council and giving parliament the ability to question the prime minister
3. Cabinet Formation - new rights of approval for the parliament on the appointment of the cabinet including the right to seek amendments of or reject the government’s annual plan
4. Judicial Reform - a commitment to further judicial reform including the use of international expertise in order to entrench standards in line with international best practice and strengthen the constitutional independence of the judiciary
5. Security – a commitment to the universal application of the rule of law and a new code of conduct for the security forces preserving the impartiality, probity and integrity of service

However, al-Wefaq rejected the proposed reforms as superficial and claimed that the five points fell short of the ‘seven principles’ framework that was agreed with the Crown Prince in 2011 which included (according to the Chatham House report): “a parliament with full authority, a government that represents the will of the people, ‘fair’ voting districts, discussion of naturalisation policies, combating corruption, protecting public assets, addressing sectarian tensions and implementing BICI recommendations on human rights”. There was no mention of political prisoners or sectarian discrimination. The failure to make any progress in the aftermath of the national dialogue has contributed to political and social polarisation in Bahrain and increased the risk of further radicalisation of the opposition forces.

With the opposition refusing to participate in the 2014 elections without any interim political deal, Bahrain’s problems will remain for the foreseeable future. However, work can still be done at the grassroots and civil society level to draw up proposals.

The regional media tend to contribute to the polarisation of public opinion in Bahrain. Iranian, Lebanese and Gulf television channels offer overwhelmingly partial views of the conflicts in the region, portraying their side as only acting in self-defence while the other side is the instigator of the conflict and the ensuing violence.

Saudi Arabia, Iran, US, UK all have overwhelming influence and power over Bahrain which is why Bahrain and the world are watching the tentative rapprochement between the US and Iran. For their part, most of the opposition groups have called for Western allies to reduce or remove their support for the government but at the same time some opposition groups and activist argue that calling for Western powers to apply pressure will only exacerbate the long standing problem of excessive foreign influence.

The sectarian violence in Syria and Iraq could serve as a spur for Bahrain to repair community relations and address political disputes in order to avoid suffering the same fate.

Some of the suggestions proposed in the report are:

• Addressing perceptions of economic and social justice relating to jobs, corruption, discrimination and population pressures
• Authorities to use Gulf aid to fund training, job and enterprise opportunities on a more meritocratic basis
• A large proportion of Bahrain’s educated middle class and its youth could potentially lead grassroots dialogue efforts and play a constructive role in drawing up a political settlement. Two thirds of Bahrain’s population are under the age of 30; it was the young who were the driving force behind the 2011 uprisings
• Dialogue should be revived and based on the Crown Prince’s seven principles and the BICI recommendations
• The Bahrain Debate should be reinstated and broadcast on national television
• Dialogue centres should be set up in each area to collect ideas that would be relayed to relevant government agencies and efforts made to bring various people to these centres to expose them to different perspectives
• The ‘Youth Parliament’ should be reinstated
• Instead of promoting new civil society organisations, the US and UK should discourage the authorities from repressing those that already exist

This is the link to the full report on the Chatham House website: http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/bahrain-civil-society-and-political-imagination

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[1] A significant percentage are Sunnis from Pakistan. The Pak-Bahrain defence cooperation helped Bahrain set up its naval forces and 18 per cent of the Gulf state's air force comprises Pakistani personnel. It is estimated that almost 10,000 Pakistanis are serving in security services.

[2] This has made some in the Shi’a community in Bahrain uneasy, fearing they would get pushed out by the growing Sunni population thus becoming a minority.