Bahrain Update

Khalil al-Marzooq appeared in court today (18th November) to appeal a travel ban imposed on him. Khalil al-Marzooq, an MP and political assistant of al-Wefaq's Secretary-General was banned from travelling and arrested in September for his political views and encouraging anti-government violence. He appeared in court today after spending 38 days in detention. His appeal was subsequently rejected. He is also being charged under anti-terrorism codes which can lead to him being stripped of his citizenship. His next hearing has been set for 12th December where al-Marzooq's lawyers will challenge the charges against him.   

The al-Wefaq National Islamic Society have always maintained that al-Marzooq's trial is politically motivated and lacked credibility. Al-Marzooq's arrest has sparked international condemnation of Bahrain by the US, the EU and international human rights organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. 

National dialogue which was due to resume were stalled following his arrest. On 3rd November, Sheikh Ali Salman, al-Wefaq's Secretary-General was charged with insulting the Ministry on Interior and was subjected to a 6 hour interrogation. He has accused the government of using national dialogue as a cover for on-going abuses. For now, the opposition has not ruled out further talks and the Bahrain government has also reaffirmed their commitment to dialogue. 

Human rights activists also appealed to the United States government to withhold the sale of arms to the Bahrain government and put pressure on them to adopt long-delayed reforms. In the last 13 years, the US government has sold some $1.4 billion worth of weapons to Bahrain.US based NGO, Human Rights First stated that "As Bahrain slides towards greater instability, it is time for the United States to adopt a more active approach, making clear that there will be serious consequences for the Bahrain regime if it continues to fail to reform." 

Bahrain is also home to the US Gulf fifth fleet and a $580 million military project to develop the naval base is also under way. The Obama administration has been heavily criticised for its "ambiguous and inconsistent" approach to Bahrain. Despite the violent crackdowns on protesters and detention of hundreds of activists, the US has failed to act or impose any sanctions on the Bahrain government. 

A recent report titled "Plan B for Bahrain: What the US should do next" by Human Rights First states that, "The United States should adopt a new approach to Bahrain to promote long-term stability and reduce the chances of one day having to decide where it should relocate the Fifth Fleet."

There has been little follow through on the recommendations made and no government official has been held accountable for the deaths of activists and key political figures in detention. Human Rights First's Brian Dooley in his brief stated that "Bahrain is a strategic regional ally of the United States and is home to the US Navy's Fifth Fleet. The United States should rethink its strategy as human rights abuses persist on the fleet's doorstep."

US group backs opposition

The American Group Human Rights First are taking a strong stance on Bahrain. They have just issued a report and their conclusions are as follows:

Since 2011 the United States has devoted considerable
diplomatic resources to Bahrain, in a two-fold strategy:

1. encourage the government of Bahrain to fulfill its promises to implement recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report commissioned in 2011 by Bahraini King Hamad; and 
2. bolster the crown prince and the “reformist” wing of the monarchy in the hope that it can deliver reform.

This strategy has largely failed, and the United States
needs to develop an alternative to support a stable
transition to democracy and the rule of law. There is no
status quo in Bahrain, and an inflammation of national and
regional sectarianism further threatens a peaceful solution
to the crisis. Political and economic stability is an illusion,
and pro-democracy activists are growing desperate. There
will either be reform, or a descent into worsening violence
with a sectarian edge that some U.S. officials are already
privately comparing to Lebanon and Syria.

The focus of a new strategy should be to publicly seek
new partners inside or outside the government who can
bring about the required transition, including more public
support for opposition figures inside and outside of jail.
Bahrain needs a leadership to walk the country out of its
current crisis, one that recognizes that time is running out
for a peaceful transition to real democracy and the rule of
law. In the absence of such leadership and reform,
protestors are increasingly likely to look for succor from
Iran.

A second key element of the strategy should be to
undermine the creeping sectarianism taking root in
Bahrain, with some restaurants and coffee shops being
designated as “Sunni” or “Shia.” Workplace and school
interactions between people from different sects are
increasingly strained, and the makeup of the security
forces should reflect the communities they serve.

Wholesale reform of the security sector is crucial, including
accountability for past violations. The United States can
support Bahrain security sector reform through rigorous
implementation of the ‘Leahy Law,’ designed to withhold
assistance from any unit of the security forces of a country
where there is credible evidence that anyone in that unit
has committed a gross violation of human rights.

If the political and human rights situation in Bahrain does
not improve, the vital military assets of the Fifth Fleet could
become a tool not only for a corrupt regime, but also a
symbol of American weakness and hypocrisy. The United
States may not be able to control the outcome, but––for its
own strategic interests and the good of the Bahraini
people—it should do everything it can to persuade the
regime to choose the right path.

The government of Bahrain regularly blames Iran as an
outside agitator of the protests, and in November 2013
four men were sentenced to life and six others to 15 years
in jail on charges of establishing a militant cell linked to
Iran's Revolutionary Guard. Claims that Iran is helping to
mastermind the protest movement have been made for
some years now, with little evidence produced. As the BICI
report drily noted, “The evidence presented to the
Commission by the GoB on the involvement by the Islamic
Republic of Iran in the internal affairs of Bahrain does not
establish a discernible link between specific incidents that
occurred in Bahrain during February and March 2011 and
the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

The current thaw in U.S.–Iran relations might lessen
tensions over possible Iranian involvement, but real fears
remain that Iran would be happy to exploit the turbulence
in Bahrain. Such intervention appears likely to become a
self-fulfilling prophecy the longer the current impasse
continues, with protestors seeing little movement from the
regime and few consequences from international
governments for the lack of reform. The temptation for
protestors to turn to Iran for help is likely to increase.
In developing a new strategy, the U.S. government should
publicly inform the Bahraini government that the future of
the Fifth Fleet requires political and social stability, which,
at a minimum, requires the protection of human rights and
their defenders, and there will be consequences to the
partnership if the government of Bahrain does not
adequately reform to provide that.

The December 2013 Manama Dialogue––an annual forum
organized by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies to exchange views on regional security
challenges––offers an immediate opportunity for the U.S.
government to press this approach directly at a senior
level. The United States should send senior officials from
the State Department and the Department of Defense to
the regional security summit to make clear, in person, to
their Bahraini counterparts that the current situation is
untenable and that political prisoners should be
immediately released.

New measures could range from incentive to punitive, but
the U.S. government cannot accept promises of reform as
evidence of reform.

Specifically, the U.S. government should:

• Publicly state U.S. concerns about the deteriorating situation and the potential for large-scale violence, emphasizing that it can be avoided only through reform, not repression.
• Amplify this message via senior officials in State Department and the Department of Defense urging the release of the peaceful opposition figures and other political prisoners, and ask to visit them in prison in the meantime. President Obama should publicly reiterate the call for the release of all peaceful political leaders from jail.
• Publicly announce it will continue to meet Bahraini opposition figures without the presence of a Bahraini government representative, and promptly do so.
• Send senior representatives from the Departments of State and Defense to the Manama Dialogue in December 2013 to press for the release of political prisoners and other essential reforms.
• Defend U.S. officials under attack by the government of Bahrain and its representatives for their advocacy of human rights and reform, including by publicly responding to the attacks and issuing demarches.
• Press to reduce the influence of those responsible for human rights violations inside and outside of the government. It should consider imposing visa bans and freezing assets of those it believes guilty of human rights violations.
• Withhold arms sales and transfers to the police and military, contingent on human rights progress, starting with a request for the current representation levels of Shias in the police and military to be made publicly available with a view to establishing recruitment and promotion targets for underrepresented groups.
• Vigorously implement the Leahy Law governing U.S. military and other security assistance to Bahrain.
• Promote the State Department March 2013 guidelines titled U.S. Support for Human Rights Defenders to Bahraini civil society, including in Arabic.
• Engage, via the U.S. embassy in Manama, more closely and regularly with a broad range of human rights defenders in Bahrain by calling and visiting them, and visiting their families if they are in jail.
• Publicly call for international media and international human rights organizations to be afforded meaningful access to Bahrain.

Amnesty International on Marzooq Arrest

The arrest of the prominent opposition leader Khalil al-Marzouq in Bahrain last night is the authorities’ latest move to tighten the noose on political opposition in the country and silence anyone seen to be critical of the authorities, Amnesty International said.

“Khalil al-Marzouq is a prisoner of conscience, imprisoned only for of his vehement criticism of the government. He must be immediately and unconditionally released,” said Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui Middle East and North Africa Deputy Director at Amnesty International.

“His arrest is yet another blow to the National Dialogue which the Bahraini authorities have been flaunting as a reason to cancel the visit of the UN expert on torture to the country. However harsh his speech towards the authorities, he should not have been arrested for expressing his views.”

Khalil al-Marzouq, the Assistant Secretary General of al-Wefaq, the registered political association representing the majority Shi’a population in Bahrain, and former Head of the Legislative and Legal Committee in parliament, was arrested on 17 September.

He was interrogated by the Public Prosecutor in the presence of a lawyer for seven hours.

Khalil al-Marzouq has been charged with incitement to violence after he gave speech critical of the government on 6 September at a political rally attended by nearly 6,000 people near the village of Saar. During the speech a masked man passed near the podium and gave him a white flag which Khalil put aside. The flag allegedly symbolises the “14 February Movement”, a loose network of youth groups established in 2011 which has called for the end of the monarchy. Some of the movement’s members are on trial, accused of using violence.

Amnesty International has reviewed the video of the 6 September speech by Khalil al-Marzooq and the flag incident, but does not believe there is any incitement to violence in them.

The Public Prosecution ordered Khalil al-Marzouq’s detention for 30 days pending an investigation. If convicted he faces a lengthy jail sentence and the possibility of his nationality being revoked.

Khalil and al-Wefaq have repeatedly stated that they are against the use of violence and are committed to achieving change through peaceful means.

“Over recent months, the Bahraini government has increased its threats and attacks against political associations which are critical of the government, in particular al-Wefaq. This must stop and Bahrain’s allies can no longer hide behind the National Dialogue to mute their criticisms under the pretext that it could derail the process,” said Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui.

This latest arrest comes only days after a joint statement by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Bahrain, signed by 47 countries, expressed concerns about the ongoing human rights violations in Bahrain.

As a response to Khalil al-Marzooq’s detention and other serious ongoing human rights violations the political opposition associations have today announced their decision to suspend their participation in the National Dialogue which had just resumed after two months of summer break.

In July the King issued several decrees which, among other things, banned demonstrations, sit-ins and public gatherings in Manama indefinitely and toughened punishments laid out in the 2006 anti-terrorism legislation. In early September the Minister of Justice issued a decree adding new restrictions on political associations. Political associations must now notify the Ministry of Justice three days before any meeting with a foreign diplomat and must take place in the presence of an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Opposition behaving like petulant children

The Bahrain opposition failed to turn up for the National Dialogue this week. This is beyond childish. We have an expression for it in English. We call it "Cutting off your own nose to spite your face". It is the height of stupidity.

The group that calls itself Citizens for Bahrain   has just written to us as follows:

Citizens for Bahrain has expressed its hope on several recent occasions that all sides will renew their efforts to make the National Dialogue a success; in the belief that this is the only satisfactory route out of the ongoing political crisis.

Therefore, we strongly condemn the failure of opposition groups to show up at this week’s session. The pace of the Dialogue is already far too slow, with various groups temporarily pulling out under different weak pretexts. It is unacceptable for certain parties to withdraw every time something occurs that they don’t like – this is a recipe for indefinite stalemate. It is also important that the Bahraini Authorities avoid unnecessary measures that damage confidence and trust between the parties of the Dialogue.

All groups should be putting the national interests ahead of their own special interests and factional agendas if they desire a solution, which benefits Bahrain. Extremists and those who do not desire dialogue and are not willing to reach a consensus should not play a part in efforts to agree on a shared vision for Bahrain’s political future.

Too much time has already been wasted and Dialogue participants should be answerable for the fact that after several months of halting efforts, they still have not agreed on an agenda for their meetings. This is resulting in the Dialogue process losing credibility among citizens.

More dangerous still – a vacuum in the Dialogue process gives encouragement to militants and terrorists who want to destroy the fabric of our society.

The hopes and expectations of all Bahrainis are upon the shoulders of those participating in the National Dialogue. We hope these esteemed figures have the necessary political will to shoulder their responsibilities.

Diplomats should ignore Bahrain's new law

There's a new law in Bahrain. And it means a considerable infringement on freedom of speech. Very disturbing really:

On September 3, Bahrain announced another limitation on its very limited democracy, which allows elections but not political parties. The new rule was clear, at least in Bahrain-speak: the island's political "societies" need to ask for permission to meet with foreign diplomats at least three days in advance and, if permission is granted, accept that a government-nominated observer will also attend. The new regulation was no doubt aimed at Shiite opposition groups, which withdrew from parliament in 2011 after a government clampdown on violent demonstrations led neighboring Saudi Arabia to intervene with tanks and soldiers to bolster the government of the Sunni monarch, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa.

See: BAHRAIN'S CHALLENGE TO U.S. DIPLOMACY

Five police injured in Bahrain clashes

The vast demonstrations that were anticipated in Bahrain this month never materialised. Instead there has been a ratcheting up of violent action. Things do not bode well on that basis alone:

The Peninsula - 19 August, 2013

Five Bahraini police were wounded late on Saturday as security forces clashed with opposition protesters in a Shia village north of the capital, police said.

The injuries were inflicted by a “group of terrorists” at the entrance to the village of Dair with a “home-made explosive device,” a statement carried by the official BNA news agency said.

FOR FULL REPORT CLICK HERE

AUGUST 14th - DAY OF RECKONING

After a long and anxious countdown, the day of reckoning is finally here. Called Tamarrud Day or the day of rebellion by the Bahraini youth in honour of the Tamarrud Movement in Egypt which saw the fall of Morsi. Bahrain has been bracing itself for the biggest protest of the year.

Why August 14th? August 14th marks the country’s independence from Great Britain. Instead of celebrating one of the most important events in Bahraini history, the masses have chosen the very same day to take to the streets to fight for their rights.

Maryam al-Khawaja, a prominent human rights activist and acting president of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights was denied permission to board a British Airways flight from Copenhagen to Manama ahead of the protests at the request of the Bahrain government.

Said Yousif al Muhafda of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights stated that, “Everyone’s talking about the date, waiting for it. I’m expecting large protests throughout the country – not just in the villages but in the capital Manama too.”

In the weeks prior to the protests, King Hamid al-Khalifa had issued decrees banning peaceful protests as well as implementing measures to crackdown on sit-in protests in the capital and to have the citizenship of anyone found guilty of “committing or inciting an act of terrorism” stripped. He also approved for the prosecution of parents of children aged under 16 who participate in demonstrations. The government has also imposed tight security ahead of the protests.

Following the utter failure of the so-called national dialogue, there has been nil progress in regards to the fate of those imprisoned for thought crime and the continued imprisonment of the ‘Bahrain 13.’ Nabeel Rajab, the head of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights was imprisoned 2 years ago as well as Zainab al Khawaja. Blogger Mohammad Hassan Sayef was also arrested before the protests.

Al-Wefaq, Bahrain’s largest opposition group has announced that it will not be officially joining the protest but it supported the people’s right to peaceful demonstrations. According to Sheikh Ali Salman the leader of al-Wefaq, “From what I have been hearing around, I know that it is going to be a peaceful movement but having said that I also expect clashes between the government forces and the protesters, because they are against all protests and demonstrations. I only pray that there are no victims.”

The UK’s Foreign Office claims to ‘oppose tyranny and hold repressive regimes to account’. Respect for human rights is said to be ‘a consistent theme that runs through Britain’s foreign policy’. It is ‘something on which we will not compromise’. Yet David Cameron invited King Hamid to discuss a £1 billion deal to sell Bahrain Typhoon fighters.

A conference was held in the House of Lords today calling on the British government to change its stance on Bahrain.

Iran: Mixed Motives?

This week David Cameron had a secret meeting with King Hamad of Bahrain. On the same day the King issued new decrees to ban protests.

Iran: Mixed Motives?

Poor Bahrain

Tensions mount in Bahrain. It is unfortunate that the National Dialogue was suspended for Ramadan. It seemed like a reasonable thing to do. Indeed the NCF rushed out its own Bahrain report because of the Ramadan deadline. But now, in retrospect, we are reminded that time is not on our side. So far Bahrain has escaped the worst excesses of the Arab Spring. Hopefully it will continue to do so. But there have been disturbing levels of violence of late. There are sub plots here. Iran is undoubtedly angry at the Bahrain lead in getting the GCC to declare Hezbollah a terrorist organisation. But it's no good blaming outsiders - this is a Bahrain issue and only Bahrain can deliver the reforms that will save the country.

It is sad now to see the polarization of various sides. The anti-government Bahrain Centre for Human Rights is angry that, "An extraordinary session National Assembly put forward 22 recommendations that include banning all protests in Manama, and a series of harsh punishments to deal with suspects in cases of terrorism." Whereas the pro-government Citizens for Bahrain point out that, "The extraordinary meeting of Bahrain’s National Assembly came after a series of serious terrorist incidents, including a bombing outside a Mosque".

This situation needs cool heads lest this truly titanic struggle becomes violent in a hitherto truly unforeseen way.

BAHRAIN REPORT: IMAGINING A WAY FORWARD

This report is compiled by Bahrain Human Rights Monitor and the Next Century Foundation in cooperation with the Value Web. 

Please note that we have not addressed the full history of the situation or analysed the underlying tensions in Bahrain that make such a report necessary - on the assumption that the reader will be aware of the background.

Note also that we have not, in every instance, detailed the specific approach that should be adopted, for instance we have suggested that there should be greater female participation in government without stating which mechanism is appropriate to facilitate this (e.g. quotas). Similarly we have addressed the importance of full participation in forthcoming parliamentary elections without addressing the question of whether they should be held more expeditiously than presently planned. 

Report No. 59 dated: 7^th July 2013

Bahrain: Imagining a way forward

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE KEY PLAYERS

Bahrain stands at an important crossroads. At this moment in time its troubles remain low-level in terms of disruption and violence. The national dialogue has resumed, though it will be suspended for Ramadan by mutual consent (note that when it reconvenes it might be helpful if opposition representation in the dialogue was reinforced). Meanwhile, the radical opposition movements under the umbrella of a loose coalition called the “February 14th movement”, protest by blocking roads with burning tyres and throwing Molotov cocktails. These elements are yet to turn to more drastic measures. The dialogue should continue in order to ensure that the people of Bahrain have legitimate choices for the national elections (currently due to take place late in 2014 though some believe that parliament should be dissolved and fresh elections held sooner – subject to the revision of constituency boundaries).

The full participation by the mainstream opposition in the forthcoming elections is vital to the future of stability in Bahrain. Bahrain’s problems are not beyond repair. This report outlines recommendations to the six major parties whose input could play a role in shaping the future of Bahrain.

This report recommends that the monarchy should continue to introduce reforms with significant concessions, particularly in the areas of popular representation and freedom of expression; this would benefit all sectors of the Bahraini society, including the opposition, who should in turn openly and clearly denounce violence, and acknowledge a well defined and accepted future role for the Monarch in the government of Bahrain in a way that would allay the fears of the establishment.

More importantly, it should be stressed that Bahrain’s problems should, wherever possible, not be viewed through a sectarian lens. This is not, per se, a Sunni-Shiite conflict. Essentially the issue concerns the degree ofÓ Y7Y reform to be implemented in Bahrain.

The momentous events of 3 July 2013 in Egypt, the 14 June presidential result in Iran, and even the leadership transition in neighbouring Qatar have relevance for Bahrain. Just as the peoples of the two largest countries in the Middle East are renewing their insistence on creating governments which will focus on their rights, dignity, and the rule of law, so too should the Kingdom of Bahrain use these events to rebalance its own political destiny. The recognition that the time has come for a younger generation of leaders to begin handling the affairs of state is also a point which should resonate in Bahrain.

The recommendations contained in this proposal are all geared towards this end -- to reintroduce harmony into the Bahrain political setting and to restore an environment where opportunity and security are available to all citizens.

With discussions under the National Dialogue in abeyance over the period of Holy Ramadan, the celebrations of "Id al-Fitr" at the end of this month of fasting and reflection offers His Majesty an opportunity to re-invigorate the reform process of his country with a commitment to our proposals which would secure the future stability and prosperity of the Kingdom.

The key observations and recommendations for the Key Players:

The following report is the outcome of deliberations by the Next Century Foundation (NCF), Bahrain Human Rights Monitor (BHRM) and The Value Web. The NCF and BHRM have compiled what we hope is a consistent report. It should be noted that not everybody consulted in the preparation of this report can be said to have subscribed to its full and final text:

The recommendations to the Monarchy and the Government

The Government should respect the principle of freedom of speech and expression. It should tolerate criticism no matter how harsh as long as it does not involve incitement to hatred or violence. The Government should also respect the right to association and the right to assembly as long as it is being conducted peacefully and according to the law.

The Government should take the necessary measures to ensure that no inflammatory rhetoric is ever used to cast doubt on the loyalty of any citizen or a group of people and prohibit the use of sectarian discourse by any party.

The Government should enhance the ongoing dialogue with the opposition. The Government and all the concerned parties need to recognize the necessity for compromise.

Specific Recommendations for the Government:

1. Electoral Reform – In today’s Bahrain, disparate constituency size affects fair representation in parliament. In the 2010 elections, the five largest districts by electorate were all won by Al Wefaq, while the five smallest districts were all won by other candidates. The average electorate size for districts won by Al Wefaq was over 10,000, while for the rest it was less than 6,300. In total, the number of eligible voters in districts won by Al Wefaq was 181, 238, while the total in those districts won by others was 137,430 — and yet this translated into only 18 parliamentary seats for Al Wefaq, while other groups were victorious in 22.

In order to combat this irregularity, this report suggests a move to proportional representation with a single national constituency. We recommend that there be a minimum 5% threshold for representation within parliament to prevent radical groups being given a platform. We also recommend (without attempting to lay down how this should be achieved) that there be a higher representation of women, who won only one seat in the last full parliamentary elections in 2010 and now hold just four after the by-elections in 2011.  The net result of these reforms would be to make the electoral system fairer and more representative.

Currently no international monitoring is allowed. Trust in the election process needs to be restored.

Power Sharing - The authority to select a cabinet should be jointly vested in the King and the Council of Representatives. According to the latest constitutional amendments that entered into effect on May 3^rd 2012, the House of Representatives are already able to act independently, in a motion akin to a vote of no-confidence in the cabinet, to force the King to either relieve the cabinet from office and appoint a new cabinet, or dissolve the Parliament, albeit after consultations with the Chairmen of both the Shura and the Representatives’ Councils in addition to the Chairman of the Constitutional court. This amendment represents a positive step that may lead to the granting of even more powers to the elected Parliament; the King himself has confirmed that reform is an evolutionary process that will continue (new amendments must be put in place so that the cabinet represents the outcome of elections and that the cabinet must win a vote of confidence).

The king also has the power to listen to petitions from individuals, as is traditional in Arab societies.  It is important that the king maintain this power as to do so would reassure the traditionalists in the population in the country and maintain their confidence in the reform process

3. Bill of Rights – A bill of rights should be drawn up to protect the liberty of the citizens of Bahrain and bring the actions of the state into line with international conventions on human rights, including the right to religious freedom, free media and free speech. This bill of rights should be enforced by an independent judiciary, selected and appointed by the King under the guidance and consent of parliament. In this respect, the steps taken so far by the Government to ensure conformity with international standards, such as the step taken regarding the definition of torture in Bahrain’s penal code, should be viewed favourably. Bahrain has ratified the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, and a special court needs to be set-up so that all laws that contravene this internationally binding covenant are nullified.
4. Accountability – To continue the process of holding to account members of the security forces found to have broken the law or otherwise to have committed abuses of human rights. Also to promote respect for the rule of law by ensuring that all citizens and residents of Bahrain are held accountable for offences such as exploiting public office for private enrichment, and enforce transparency in government financial dealings and the financial holdings and interests of all officials of the cabinet.
5. Release of Prisoners of Conscience – The government should release prisoners of conscience. One of the major sources of contention both domestically and internationally has been the detention of activists because of online posts and involvement in demonstrations. These people are often charged with stirring up unrest or writing anti-monarchy statements. Freeing such people would demonstrate the government’s adherence to and recognition of internationally and nationally recognised principles of freedom of speech and expression. We take note of the Prosecutor-General’s announcement on May 18th that  it was decided to drop charges that contravene Bahrain's commitment to uphold the principles of freedom of speech and expression, and that relevant  legislative amendments have been introduced to that effect . While we applaud the fact that at least 334 of those facing charges have benefited from that decision, including the medical staff at Salmaniya Hospital and those accused of conspiracy to topple the government, we sincerely hope that this pattern will continue and that the courts would demonstrate full compliance in that respect.
6. The Rebuilding of Mosques – The Government should speed up the process of rebuilding the Shi’a mosques damaged or destroyed in the past three years. This would help rebuild trust between the authorities and the Shiite community in a way that could alleviate some of the prevailing sectarian tension. We welcome the announcement by the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs last April 2013 of a scheduled rebuilding plan, and hope that such a plan would ensure the speedy rebuilding of all the affected religious sites as detailed in the BICI report’s recommendations. Having said which, it should be stressed however, that Bahrain’s problems should, wherever possible, not be viewed through a sectarian lens. This is not, per se, a Sunni-Shiite conflict. There are Sunnis amongst the opposition and Shiites who support the government. Essentially the issue concerns the degree of reform to be implemented in Bahrain.
7. The Independence of the official media – The Government should guarantee the independence of state-owned Media by putting it under the supervision of an independent body approved by Parliament. Royal Decree No. 47 / 2013 established a Supreme Independent Authority for Information and Communication. We hope that this represents a step towards greater press freedom rather than an attempt to impose greater control on journalists; whilst at the same time we hope this new body will adopt a criteria and principles that would ensure the elimination of any sectarian excesses within state-owned media institutions.
8. Decentralisation of Power – Trust can be re-established by devolution of power to local authorities.      This is particularly the case when it comes to policing and the security forces. Policing should be staffed and controlled locally with minimal central control. There should nevertheless also be a national police regulatory body with oversight over the domestic intelligence agencies. Further to decentralising the police force, there should also be more municipal power to provide services, e.g. local control of schools and housing. The strengthening of local governance would greatly help to address the major political, economic and social grievances as it would allow people to decide through their elected councillors in all matters that affect their day to day life in the areas of employment, education, healthcare, security and policing.
9. Improve negotiating skills – The negotiating skills of both the opposition and the government are poor. Both sides tend to be confrontational and to wish to score points as if on the battlefield rather than trying to create the best possible outcome for the future of the Kingdom of Bahrain. The government is best placed to change the culture of confrontation by being more conciliatory in its approach to negotiations.  
10. Cooperation with the International Community – The Government should refrain from entertaining any thought of ceasing to cooperate with, or denying access to, international human rights organisations. It is important that the Bahrain Government realise that denying these organisations proper access to the country will only serve to confirm the perception that Bahrain has something to hide. Cooperation with international NGOs should be an essential component of Bahrain’s endeavour to promote its human rights standing.

The recommendations to The Opposition

Al Wefaq is a major opposition voice. It occupied eighteen out of the forty seats in parliament after the last full parliamentary election in 2010. Al Wefaq’s threat of non-participation in the elections next year is an understandable tactic to try to gain some leverage in discussions but it is unhelpful in the context of trying to engender an open and progressive national dialogue. It would not bode well for the future of Bahrain if elections were to take place next year without the participation of Al Wefaq.

There are, of course, other opposition parties, such as Waad and the Progressive Democratic Tribune as well as the underground youth movements partly responsible for the unrest on the streets. A sincere effort should be made by Al Wefaq (with the government's concurrence) to bring some if not all of these divergent, dissonant voices into the mainstream discussions. This would ensure that the focus is not solely on Al-Wefaq and that other sections of the opposition are represented to ensure the future stability of Bahrain.

Mainstream opposition groups could attract more marginalised voters by demonstrating that they can be a real alternative. Bringing members of the “February 14^th” movement into the political process is important. The mainstream opposition should attempt to appeal to the less hard-line elements of this movement through a change in rhetoric.

Specific Recommendations for the opposition:

1. Denounce Violence:  One of the key issues for Bahrain is the violence and unrest on the streets.  Al-Wefaq should keep protests peaceful and refrain from inflammatory rhetoric. It should rein in the radical elements and make it unequivocally clear that Al-Wefaq denounces violence and those who resort to it. It should, accordingly, distance itself from any group that would not embrace the principles of peaceful participation in domestic political life. The party should announce that it will do this unilaterally, even if opposed by radical opposition groups or prominent clerics. Ideally, Sheikh Isa Qassim will endorse the principle of non-violence and join Al-Wefaq and other elements of Bahraini society in denouncing violence perpetrated by either government or opposition supporters, regardless of affiliation.

The undertaking to unilaterally denounce violence would represent a powerful gesture rather than a concession. A gesture of this kind would also put the onus on the government to then deliver genuine compromise.  

2. Continue to participate in dialogue with the government as well as with non-Shi’ite political societies such as the National Unity Gathering, with a view to reaching an agreement on meaningful political reform. Had the opposition heeded the initial call for dialogue by the Crown Prince, it might have averted the current crisis.
3. Openly acknowledge a well defined role for the Monarchy in the future of Bahrain The opposition objective should be to seek an expansion of political rights, not to overthrow the monarchy. It should also acknowledge that the king will have a pivotal role in the transition to a more democratic Bahrain. This will help alleviate the fears of the Sunni population were a significant power shift to emerge, and prevent a potential Sunni backlash against any electoral reform concessions.
4. Greater Representation for Women – There needs to be greater representation of minorities within the mainstream opposition parties. This is particularly the case with Al Wefaq and the other Islamist parties, which have no women representatives. If the government of Bahrain is going to be representative of the people, it must have a number of women representatives.

Measures should be taken towards ensuring that parties are formed on a non-sectarian basis, which would incidentally, however, produce a fairer representation of the religions within the country.

There is also a real need to empower younger people by involving the youth of Bahrain in the mainstream political parties.

5. Wider Policy Reach – The anti-government parties need to work on their policies so as to offer something more than mere opposition to the current government.   They need to state a clear economic and social manifesto, so people know what they will do when elected.
6. Encourage Shiite Participation in Various Areas – As part of the BICI report recommendations it was advised that Shiites be integrated into the security forces.

This is a recommendation that has partially been taken up with hiring of police cadets that according to the government represent “all communities in Bahrain”. Whilst this is something that needs to be facilitated locally, the opposition can have an impact on the Shiite community by encouraging them to take up these roles of responsibility when they become available.

The recommendations to Saudi Arabia

The special relationship between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia allows the latter to play a positive role in the future of Bahrain particularly with the knowledge that events in Bahrain could spill into its own borders and cause unwanted unrest in certain Saudi regions. The Saudi forces constituted the bulk of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) forces that entered Bahrain in March 2011 to safeguard Bahrain’s security and sovereignty. Riyadh’s interest lies in a swift and painless end to the unrest in Bahrain.

Furthermore, the longer the unrest goes on, the more influence an opportunistic Iran could begin to wield amongst a further disenfranchised Shiite community. Added to this, Saudi Arabia, as a regional power, would want to be seen as a major contributor to bringing about a peaceful settlement to the crisis in Bahrain.

Recommendations:

1. Saudi Arabia should pursue a policy that publicly supports efforts to resolve the crisis in Bahrain through dialogue and meaningful reforms.
2. For the sake of stability in Bahrain and the region, Saudi Arabia should work closely with friends and allies such as the United States to encourage all parties to the Bahrain crisis to seek a peaceful conclusion to their conflict and to pursue the reforms stipulated in its National Action Charter and further reinforced by the recommendation of the BICI report.
3. Direct Aid to Support Reform – Saudi Arabia should use its economic influence over Bahrain to directly support reforms as they emerge. For example, Saudi Arabia could support the continued professionalization of the police force and the eradication of corruption and torture, as suggested by BICI report, through direct aid.

The recommendations to The United States and United Kingdom

The US and UK have a special relationship with Bahrain and the USA has had a naval command presence in Bahrain for over sixty years. The US and UK should continue to encourage all parties to seek a peaceful outcome to the crisis.

Recommendations:

1. The US and UK should continue to encourage Bahrain to adhere to international human rights standards, and by the same token encourage the government to move forward by acknowledging whatever positive steps it takes in that respect.  It should also make it clear that transgressions by the Bahrain opposition, such as the use of violence, terror tactics and public disorder would equally not be tolerated.
2. Encourage Dialogue – In partnership with Saudi Arabia, the USA and UK should continue to deploy their diplomatic influence to persuade all parties involved in the dialogue process to reach some compromise. The NCF and BHRM contend that the USA and UK could offer practical advice on policy decisions and offer inducement (rather than the threat of sanctions). Their efforts to encourage dialogue should be unremitting.
3. Expert/Technical Training – Both the US and UK could offer Bahrain some valuable assistance and technical support in its endeavour to reform the judiciary systems.
4. Greater Trade Links – In order to lessen some of the dependence that Bahrain has on Saudi Arabia, the US could help Bahrain to improve its economic standing by increasing trade links with the country. A free trade agreement (FTA) was signed between Bahrain and USA on September 14th 2004. In 2011, the United States exported $1.21 billion worth of goods to Bahrain, about the same amount as in 2010. Where imports are concerned, the United States imported $518 million in goods from Bahrain, substantially more than the $420 million imported in 2010. In 2005, total bilateral trade was about $780 million, suggesting that trade has expanded significantly following the FTA. However, in light of the unrest, the AFL-CIO has urged the United States to void the FTA on the grounds that Bahrain is preventing free association of workers and abridging their rights.   It is imperative for Bahrain that this does not happen as Bahrain has little cushion to deal with economic downturns, especially since the unrest caused Moody’s to downgrade Bahrain’s rating in May 2011, making it more expensive for the government to borrow.

Bahrain badly needs to diversify away from dependence on Saudi oil, which it has done through emphasizing banking and financial services, and increased trade with USA can only help in this regard.

The recommendations to Iran

No matter what the real importance of the role played by Iran within Bahrain, it is in Iran’s own interest to work to prevent the destabilisation in the Gulf that could ensue were radical groups to gain the ascendancy in Bahrain and the rest of the region.  The victory of President-elect Hassan Rouhani in Iran presents a real opportunity for a new start in the relationship between Bahrain and Iran, a new beginning that both sides should encourage.

Recommendations:

1. Renounce claim to Bahrain as “14th province” of Iran. Iran should officially announce its renunciation of any territorial claim over Bahrain and openly declare its respect for Bahrain’s sovereignty.
2. Support non-violence – Iran should publicly call for an end to violence and aim to bring about a peaceful conclusion to the protests. Iran has been accused of inciting violence and sectarian hatred in Bahrain and fuelling unrest. Iran should put an end to its hostile and divisive media campaign in favour of a more balanced approach if regional peace and harmony are to be maintained.
3. Liaise with the Government – Iran can also use normal diplomatic avenues to liaise with the government of Bahrain to reduce misunderstanding and support reform.
4. Landmark gesture for Shiite/Sunni cooperation – As the situation improves in Bahrain, Iran could potentially invest in landmark gestures that would further enhance the sort of cooperation and peaceful coexistence that had, prior to the events of the last two years, been the characteristic of the relations between all elements of Bahraini population, particularly the Sunni and Shiite Muslims, e.g. a mixed school.  

/ Ends

A step in the right direction?

17 Bahrainis were sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on 17^th March, for the attempted murder of 4 police officers last year by planting an incendiary device at a roadblock. The attack which took place last April involved a homemade bomb planted in a roadblock made with tyres, palm tree trunks and garbage bin. The device went off as the officers approached the roadblock in their vehicle. The officers sustained injuries as a result of the explosion.

This news came following the appointment of the Crown Prince of Bahrain was as the new deputy Prime Minister. Previously shunned aside for being a moderate, his appointment has raised hopes of a resolution to end over 2 years of unrest in Bahrain.       

This will place the Crown Prince in a position that will aid efforts of finally resolving years of discord between the Sunni royal family and the majority Shia population.  

According to Khalil al-Marzook, a senior member of the leading opposition al-Wefaq society, “The challenge (for the Crown Prince) will be to leverage this senior role. Now that he is in the government, we should see his reform agenda in practice rather than in words.”

Sources close to the moderate faction in the ruling family claim that the Crown Prince is the “only one that has appeal to everyone. He listens, he takes criticism...” 

His appointment is Bahrain’s way of showing that Bahrain is making efforts to move forward on reforms however, the results remain to be seen.  

BAHRAIN REPORT

The following report was written by Samuel Morris on Bahrain and the Four Freedoms.

BAHRAIN AND THE FOUR FREEDOMS

The Kingdom of Bahrain is a nation cherished by many for its multicultural heritage and abundance of warm, hospitable people. The general perception is that the concept of democracy is a quintessential aspiration in a Middle East where democracy is the exception rather than the rule. However in the few instances in which democracy is given its head (e.g. the experiments in Algeria and Palestine) the results often seem unpalatable and are then undermined by an intolerant West. We would be the last to insist on the concept that Bahrain becomes truly democratic. Nevertheless, if we are to preserve the Bahrain we know and have come to love, changes must be made to accommodate the aspirations of its people. Therefore this report will focus on those reforms that would transform Bahrain, making it more sustainable as a Kingdom and reduce levels of social turmoil which Bahrain has been subjected to for years.

While King Hamad Al Khalifa deserves credit for his decision to establish the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), and for his prompt endorsement of its recommendations, it should be noted that some of the recommendations have not been fully implemented. It is also important to note that while the BICI report was a comprehensive investigation, it only covers a small period within a situation that continues week on week.

We believe that the full and speedy implementation of the recommendations published in the BICI report would go a long way towards easing the tension in Bahrain and restoring the trust desperately needed to push forward the processes of reconciliation and reform.

The NCF also believes that it would also be helpful to look at the situation in Bahrain under the heading of 'human security'.

The notion of ‘human security’ rather than ‘national security’ is one that is too often ignored. President Roosevelt’s four freedoms: Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Expression, Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear, serve as the basis of this concept of human security, and it is these four freedoms that this report focuses on in regard to Bahrain.   

Our understandings of these freedoms, in relation to Bahrain, are as follow:

·         Freedom of Speech and Expression: This goes beyond the freedom to talk and express oneself. It includes any act of seeking, receiving and conveying information, regardless of the medium used, which obviously includes the freedom of the press.

·         Freedom of Religion: The freedom of every person to worship in his own way in equality with other religions and without persecution.

·         Freedom from Want: Freedom from hunger and economic desperation, as individual freedom cannot truly exist without economic security.

·         Freedom from Fear: Freedom to be able to live in an environment where you neither expect arrest without trial, nor to be the object of violent protest, nor of violent suppression of protest. An environment where you are free from the fear of persecution for your beliefs or views.

Between 2008 and 2010, Bahrain improved its ranking in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index by eight places.  However, by 2011 it had slipped 22, ranking at 144 out of the 167 countries in the Index. 

With general elections scheduled to be held in 2014, the government of the Kingdom of Bahrain should redouble efforts to reverse this decline through ongoing reforms in an attempt to make those elections a time for celebration rather than conflict.

The Next Century Foundation recommends that the 2014 elections be a target date for the government of Bahrain to address its internal issues. The expedient implementation of the findings of the BICI report would go a long way to ensuring this happens.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Article 22 of the Bahrain Constitution and legislative framework provides for the freedom of an individual to profess one’s faith. However, in practice limits have been placed on this freedom. Of a total population of 1,234,571, there are 866,888 Muslims and the rest are a mix of Christians, Hindus, Jews and Bahais.[1] These groups live and worship side-by-side, practicing their religion without interference from the government or other religious groups.  However, the Shi’a community claim to be victims of systematic discrimination on religious grounds.

Bahrain does not publish statistics on the sectarian breakdown of its citizens and Shi’ite population estimates vary greatly. Tensions between these two groups (Shi’a and Sunni) have resulted in socio-economic problems and limits being placed on the extent to which the Shi’a may participate in government.[2] These tensions came to the fore and, combined with other political, social and economic factors that cut across ethnic and sectarian lines, contributed to the uprisings on 14^th February 2011.

The NCF proposes four initiatives to begin to tackle the continuing tensions:

1.       Avoid defining the conflict along sectarian lines.  

Most of those who participated in the uprisings over the past year have been from the Shi’a community. This has led many to the view that the conflict is sectarian. However, the conflict is not and has not been wholly sectarian.  The protests cut across both religious and class divides; many problems exist outside the Shi’a-Sunni framework. 

Government officials and Bahrain state television have repeatedly blamed Iran for inciting the popular unrest (Iran’s agenda being to strengthen Shi’a influence) but this is seen by the opposition as side-stepping and belittling the real issues. They view it is an indication that the government does not take their problems seriously. Although Bahrain may legitimately feel threatened by Iran and its aspirations to establish ascendency in the region, it is dangerous for the Bahrain government, through state television, to point the finger elsewhere rather than address the issues within its own borders and amongst its own people. [3]

The government has made attempts to refrain from using the sectarian nationalist narrative that is frequently employed by opposition groups. However, instances have occurred. It is crucial that all media outlets, particularly those owned or controlled by the state, should abide by a strict code of conduct that would safeguard against involvement in spreading hatred or inciting violence. The Bahrain Journalists Association has adopted a new Code of Ethics as of 20 Jan 2012. It is important that this code is adhered to as it will encourage the promotion of the values of justice, equality, tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Moreover, it is the duty of the Government in any society to ensure the impartiality of state controlled media outlets and their accessibility to the opposition and to all sectors of the community. The Information Affairs Authority has received advice on how to achieve structural reform to enhance neutrality, pluralism, credibility, rule of law and national cohesion. It should act on that advice.

The main opposition bloc and the leading opposition party, al Wefaq, have often tried to avoid sectarian divisions, calling for Sunnis and Shiites alike to ‘wave the flag of democracy’.  Even though al Wefaq is regarded as the moderate opposition, it must be recognised that there are extremist threads in the complicated and ever-shifting warp and weft of Bahrain’s political fabric.  As the conflict has continued, more idealistic, hard-line voices have emerged who have taken advantage of increasing anger on the streets.  This serves to emphasise the need for a quick political resolution of the issues that divide the people of Bahrain.  

Another opposition faction that has attempted to avoid defining the conflict along sectarian lines is Wa'ad, a secular leftist party whose secretary-general Ebrahim Sharif has been in jail since April 2011. Wa'ad are not particularly popular - all the popular forces today are Islamists, as elsewhere - but they represent an important trend among intellectuals and business people. They have a strong track record of campaigning against sectarianism. Many Wa'ad politicians have married across the sectarian divide (including Ebrahim Sharif, whose wife is a secular Shi’a).

Ebrahim Sharif has always called for reform under a constitutional monarchy (as for that matter has Al Wefaq), and has been resolutely against violence. A growing section of the opposition has been calling for a republican option, as support for groups such as Al Wefaq declines. Large swathes of those protesting are best described as the “silent opposition”. These are individuals who are out on the street but are not affiliated with a political party and go under the “February 14” banner. Most opposition groups have to listen to these protestors or risk losing legitimacy.

Time is of the essence: the longer the resistance continues, the louder the extreme voices will become.  The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain must begin to strengthen the moderate, pragmatic groups among the opposition, and stop defining the conflict along sectarian lines. It must acknowledge the fact that there are some Sunnis in opposition to the government.  If the conflict continues to increase its sectarian nature, moderates in the opposition are likely to be forced to choose sides, and invariably they will choose those the side they see as ‘their own’.  The moderate opposition would then be lost.

2. Address the issue of citizenship within Bahrain.

The issue of citizenship has long been a contentious one.  Less than half of Bahrain’s population are Bahraini citizens due to the influx of migrants and guest-workers.  There have been accusations that the Bahrain government has practiced ethnic discrimination in regards to its policy of granting citizenship i.e. attempting to favour Sunni over Shi’a during the naturalization and citizenship processes.  A Bahrain representative has argued that these were unfounded allegations, and that between 2000-2010, as many as 11,000 Shi’as had gained citizenship[4], yet through calculations of the difference between the actual rate of growth of the number of citizens and the natural population growth rate since 2001 best estimates are that 60,000 foreigners have been granted citizenship during this period. The number of non-Shi’as being granted citizenship is therefore comparatively high.

3. Address the demolition of Shi’ite mosques and places of worship.

A number of Shi’ite places of worship have been demolished by the government since the 14^th February protests.  The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain has not denied that these sites have been demolished, though it does dispute the motive behind them. The BICI Report set the number of demolished places at 30 and the government of Bahrain has unconditionally accepted this. The government claims that these buildings were illegal and without the proper permits, but the timing and nature of the demolitions calls this into question. The BICI report acknowledges that only 5 out of 30 places of worship had requisite building permits while also stating, “the Commission notes with some concern the timing of demolition (1 March 2011 to 11 May 2011), which relates it to events of February and March. The Government of Bahrain must have been aware of the construction of these structures and that they lacked proper legal permits and did not conform to building regulations. Nonetheless, the Government of Bahrain had not stopped the construction of these structures nor taken action to remove them for a number of years. The Government should have realised that under the circumstances, in particular the timing, the manner in which demolitions were conducted and the fact that these were primarily Shia religious structures, the demolitions would be perceived as a collective punishment and would therefore inflame the tension between the Government of Bahrain and the Shia population.”[5] Fortunately, the Government suspended its action.  However, the first week of December 2012 witnessed the removal of some Shi’a mosques that were being reconstructed. And during the Shi’a ceremony of Muharram in November 2012, the Interior Ministry jailed two Shia preachers and summoned scores for interrogation on the religious content of their speeches, something that has never happened before in Bahrain.   There is no clear evidence that the Government intended to punish the citizens for their religious practises. However, the timing of such actions clearly helped to inflame the situation.

 In an attempt to address this, on 22 May 2011, the King announced that new Shi’a places of worship would be built. The BICI report also recommended ‘a follow up on the King‘s statement to the effect that the Government of Bahrain will consider rebuilding, at its expense, some of the demolished religious structures in accordance with administrative regulations’. In section 1336, the Commission welcomes the Government of Bahrain addressing this question at the earliest possible time. A report by the Bahrain Centre of Human Rights, published on 26^th March 2012, claims that rebuilding has begun on five mosques.  The report also claims that when residents tried to rebuild the mosques themselves, they were prevented from doing so by the authorities, citing the example of the Ameer Mohammed Mosque, which has been rebuilt and demolished twice. The government of Bahrain claims that work has begun on 12 places at a total cost of US$26 million and that actual construction work has begun on five, while land has been fenced for the remaining seven on which construction work is to be phased in.  It should be noted, however, that reconstruction has not necessarily taken place on the sites of the existing mosques. Some of these places of worship were on sites that have had religious significance (e.g. burial sites) for over 200 years and were built because of the religious significance of the site.

Although some of the building may have been without the proper permits and thus been deemed illegal, the demolition of Shi’ite places of worship is perceived by the Shi’a community as persecution and fuels both resentment and violent backlashes.  It also further radicalises the opposition and diminishes their desire for dialogue.   The issue of the sanctity of religious places is supremely sensitive, and by not working more quickly and with more dedication to reverse the damage done, the government will only foster greater division between itself and Bahrain’s Shi’a community.

4. Remove laws and conventions that deliberately prevent Shi’ites from gaining influence.

Although there have been great improvements in the openness of Bahrain’s politics, there are still areas which need improvement. There are several practises in Bahrain’s politics that deliberately prevent or restrict Shi’a participation in the governance of Bahrain, thus leaving them politically disenfranchised.  In the 2010 elections, although Al Wefaq won only 18 out of the 40 of the seats in the Council of Deputies, they garnered a majority of the votes.  Thus, despite gaining more than 50%  of the votes, they only won 45% of the available seats.[6]

The geographic boundaries of constituencies in Bahrain are mapped out along ethnic lines to establish political advantage.  The number of voters in each voting district varies greatly, from 12,000 to 500, which of course is seen as a deliberate attempt to restrict the number of seats Shi’ite political parties are likely to win.  Because Bahrain in any case has a bicameral system with a government appointed by the King rather than by parliament, the manipulation of constituency size to this degree is unnecessary to guarantee the survival of the monarchy. The practice should be abandoned. The districting issue has been put on the negotiation table as part of the National Dialogue.

A further issue is that of election monitoring.  Though observers from Bahrain’s non-governmental organisations, independent political and civil societies groups regularly monitor elections, international observers are barred. This is not to say that Bahrain’s election results should be called into question, but international election monitors should be allowed access to comply with international best practice.  These issues should certainly be addressed before the 2014 elections.

5. Both the opposition and the government should make stronger commitment to dialogue

Having attained positions in parliament, opposition groups should utilise this key forum, particularly since a parliamentary majority could obtain a legislative veto.

Al Wefaq needs to find a credible way to re-engage in the parliamentary political process and the government needs to help facilitate this. To encourage Al Wefaq to re-engage serious concessions should be made by the government. Stepping back into the National Assembly without such concessions could be political suicide. If nothing is done and the situation continues to become more polarised, Al Wefaq may lose its popularity in the street and find itself pushed aside as hard-line opposition voices grow louder.

All opposition parties should also take part in the National Dialogue. If the National Dialogue meetings are to be successful and credible, the full spectrum of Bahrain’s political views should be present. To encourage opposition groups to a take part in such dialogue, bilateral meetings should also be organised to take place alongside the National Dialogue between the opposition (i.e. only the opposition not the pro-government parties) and the government. This would build confidence on the part of opposition groups and guarantee that their legitimate grievances are being heard.  It should however be noted that a number of opposition members are in prison and therefore cannot attend any National Dialogue.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights[7] states that "everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice".  Of course, total freedom of expression does not exist absolutely in any country, but freedom of expression remains an essential part of society, especially one as diverse as Bahrain.  Suppression of the ideas and desires of any group in a society inevitably leads to the radicalisation of those who feel stifled. If they are not able to express themselves in words they will do so in actions.

The Government of Bahrain declared a three month state of emergency and banned protests to “maintain security” and safeguard “civil peace” in March 2011. The government claimed that demonstrators had threatened “national security” by calling for the overthrow of the government. Protests have now once again been banned,[8] this time just before the beginning of Muharram, which has effectively created a situation of Marshall Law.

The NCF recommends three initiatives:

1. Enforce constitutional protections guaranteeing freedom of expression and of the press.

Articles 23 and 24 of the constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain guarantee freedom of expression, both in terms of opinion and the press.  In order for the people of the Kingdom of Bahrain to have confidence in the integrity of the government and its promises, guarantees must be given. Any form of suppression of press freedom is counterproductive and therefore serves no useful purpose. Indeed, greater press freedom might act as a safety valve, actually reducing tension.  

2. Address the treatment of opposition members.

Since February 14^th, opposition members and activists have been imprisoned without trial and there have been reports of torture and death in custody. The ICRC has been in country since January 2012, freely visiting police stations, temporary detention facilities, jails and detainees. However restrictions have been placed on human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

Though the government has agreed to retry key opposition leaders, many have not been released. Even after dropping charges for 328 people, relating to freedom of speech, some remain incarcerated for their participation in meetings and rallies challenging the monarchy.[9]

Bahrain has extended a crackdown on the opposition by revoking 31 activists nationalities claiming that they damaged national security.[10] Some may perceive these actions as being a policy driven in retaliation for the unrest last year. 

In order for national dialogue to work, the government must convince the opposition of their integrity.  Imprisoning opposition members and activists, often in the absence of due process of law, will only damage the government’s credibility.

3. Do more.

A true culture of freedom of expression will require that the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain sets a better example. Perhaps the best start that could be made would be the reform of State TV.

FREEDOM FROM WANT

The Human Development Index, as included in the 2011 UNDP Human Development Report, ranked Bahrain 42^nd out of 187 countries with comparable data.  This would suggest a high level of well-being, especially when compared to other Arab countries in the region. However, disparities in wealth are patent.  The poorest neighbourhoods of Manama and the most underdeveloped villages of the island are, for the most part, inhabited by the Shi’a community.   In 2010 unemployment figures were reported as just 3.7%, which shows an increase in employment through a global recession. However, a particular worry is that Shi’a citizens are underrepresented in the higher tiers of many public sector jobs.   This leads to accusations that the government favours non-Shi’a. 

After the protests of 14^th February, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) reported 1,624 complaints from people alleging they had been fired or suspended from their jobs over the protests.  Many of these were from the Shi’a community. However, claims have been made that all 1,624 have been given the opportunity to be reinstated.[11]

Socio-economic inequality is an issue that can ferment resentment in any society. Creating a more defined ‘us versus them’ framework will only boost fundamentalist and hard-line voices within the opposition. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain must address the socio-economic inequalities that exist within Bahrain’s borders in order to tackle any further frustration and unrest.

The government still invests heavily in its public relations in Washington and London, so evidently cares greatly about its political and economic relations with these key Western capitals. The unrest in Bahrain has strained the country's relations with its traditional friends in the US and UK, who face criticism at home over their ties with Bahrain.

An ongoing uprising in the nation will only put further strain on an already hard-hit economy and strategic relationships in the West. It is in the best interest of the government to stem the island nation’s economic troubles as this will help bring a quick and peaceful resolution to the unrest.

Through the publication of the BICI report the Kingdom of Bahrain have been using international best practice to address the problems that occurred and ways for Bahrain to move forward. The reforms being made are ongoing and are being produced in legislative form. However, without the full implementation of the reforms such legislation only acts as a facade. [12]

FREEDOM OF FEAR

In Bahrain, freedom from fear is inextricably linked to freedom of religion and of expression.  Trust in the government is the cornerstone for any successful and legitimate state, and if the government of the Kingdom of Bahrain wishes to see progress in terms of national dialogue and an end to unrest, they must increase the confidence of their citizens in their own security forces in order to pre-empt any tension that might arise in the run up to the 2014 elections.

The NCF recommends two principal proposals:

1. Ensure that the security forces reform their practices.

Incidents of police brutality towards those in custody have significantly reduced but instances still occur. The tactics of security forces should always be open to reform. Social media and networking sites are showing footage of violence on both sides of the conflict, but it is the tactics of the security forces that have attracted the most attention and criticism.  BICI found that the security forces were responsible for thirteen civilian deaths that occurred during the protests, and even goes on to describe the violent causes of these deaths. It should be noted that the BICI report only looks at a three month window during 2011, and that further deaths have occurred since.  The commission also reported deaths due to torture in police custody, and many deaths that occurred after the protests were due to the inhalation of tear gas. Furthermore, the commission found that ‘Bahrain security forces systematically raided houses in order to arrest individuals, and in so doing terrified the occupants. The security forces intentionally broke down doors, forced entry and sometimes ransacked the houses. This practice was often accompanied by sectarian insults and verbal abuse.’ [13]

The excessive force used by the Bahrain security forces must be thoroughly addressed if there is to be any hope of rebuilding the trust so crucially needed between citizen and state.  The government must now abide by its own rule of law and maintain the principle that no one is above the law, even and especially those in all hierarchies of the security forces.  The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain must continue to implement the BICI recommendations that there should be full investigations into any reports of torture, murder and harassment by security forces. The implementation of accountability measures such as the appointment of a Ministry of Interior Ombudsman are steps in the right direction but are by no means of themselves sufficient.

The Bahrain government have recently made restitutions of $6.2 million (BD 2,340,000) to be paid to 39 families over the deaths of 39 relatives.[14] This is a significant confidence building exercise by the state, however financial restitutions will have to be matched with sincere reforms. [15]

Chief author of the BICI report, Cherif Bassiouni, has been critical of the reform process. He stated that progress had been made but the reform process has stagnated. In relation to reforms in the security services he stated: “If you have approximately 200 cases and you refer only nine cases to trial in a period of a year and you have one conviction, it doesn’t seem to be a satisfactory result.”

2.  Consider further clemency for medical professionals and guarantee the provision of adequate healthcare to all.

Since February 2011, 95 medics have been detained by security forces. Although the behaviour of some of the medical professionals was difficult to reconcile with the exercise of their medical responsibilities, some of the allegations against them were unfounded.[16] Furthermore, a report by Physicians for Human Rights accuses the government of politicising and militarising the health system, claiming that the Government of Bahrain has denied a large segment of the population safe access to impartial medical care, resulting in widespread fear among civilians seeking medical treatment.

Conclusion

For the Kingdom of Bahrain, time is of the essence.  The longer the current wave of unrest continues and the more isolated the opposition is from the government, the more radicalised the opposition will become.  And the more radicalised the opposition becomes, the more desperate the government will become.    Syria serves as an awful reminder of how this security dilemma can spiral out of control.  There have been calls for reform but without sincere steps towards negotiated reforms the situation will undoubtedly deteriorate.

If the government do not act fast, they are in danger of marginalising the moderate opposition and strengthening the extremist opposition. Political stagnation means that all parties will refuse to compromise, and without compromise there will be no dialogue, national reconciliation or a consensual political settlement on the horizon. The prospect of Gulf unity could further frighten the opposition as such a union appears to shore up Sunni power on the Gulf. The Bahrain opposition, in despair, might resort to more desperate tactics, possibly even to violence.  The current political stagnation in Bahrain needs to be addressed as it is negatively impacting all political, social and economic aspects of public life. All parties should accept the principle of consensus as a basic element in alleviating the problem.

If resistance goes on and the youth movement become more and more politicised, the opposition’s vision for the future will leave less and less room for negotiation.   The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain must act fast, to ensure that the political situation is resolved in time for the 2014 elections.

[Ends]

---

[1] Figures from the 2010 Census, Central Informatics Organisation

[2] The Shi’a community is present in certain sectors of the government, especially government ministries such as the Ministries of Health and Industry, where up to 50% of the senior posts are staffed by Shiites.

[3] One such example is the airing of the “Al Rased” television programme on Bahrain television showing images of protesters and describing them as traitors with links to Iran (Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry p393).

[4] This figure was quoted at a meeting hosted by the Next Century Foundation at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Bahrain in London on the 16^th May 2012.

[5] Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. P329

[6] Al Wefaq’s claim that it garnered over 50% of the vote is disputed by the government which claims that the party obtained 43% of the vote.

[7] Acceded to by Bahrain in 2006

[8] Restrictions on public demonstrations and other public gatherings were introduced on 30 October 2012. Bahrain said the ban was a temporary step.

[9] Key figures such as Nabeel Rejab, and Zainab and Abdulhadi al-Khawaja attracted international attention at their arrest. Nabeel Rejab is serving a three year sentence and claims to be held in solitary confinement. Abdulhadi al-Khawaja is currently serving a life sentence after being arrested in April 2011 for his activity as a protest organiser. His daughter Zainab al-Khawaja has been repeatedly arrested.

[10] On 7 November2012, Bahrain decided to revoke the nationality of 31 citizens for 'having undermined state security'. The decision violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The men include London-based dissident Saeed al-Shehabi.

[11] In reality these claims are slightly misleading. Some employees have been placed in work other than their original occupation, often in lesser positions, whilst some others remain in the Ministry of Labour’s job placement program and have yet to find gainful employment.

[12] As Cherif Bassiouni himself recently stated: “A number of recommendations on accountability were either not implemented or implemented only half-heartedly.”

[13] Bahrain Commission of Independent Inquiry, article 1172, p.280

[14] These victims include all 35 deaths described in the BICI report as well as 4 deaths – three civilians and one police – that followed the events.

[15] Three compensation mechanisms have been established to make these restitutions however there are now details given on two of the mechanisms and the third has been effectively stopped by Royal Decree.

[16] Twenty medical professionals who were involved in the 2011 protests were sentenced to prison terms (Dr Ali al-Ekry was sentenced to 15 years in prison on more than a dozen charges; the remaining 19 doctors/medical workers received lesser prison sentences). They were accused of crimes against the state which included inciting hatred, occupying Salmaniya Hospital, and attempting to overthrow the Government.   A further 28 medical workers faced misdemeanour charges.  Of the 48 accused, 47 were Shi’a.  Following a recent trial verdict, only two of the defendants now face comparatively long prison terms. They should be treated with clemency. Then on 21 November 2012, 23 medics were sentenced to 3 months imprisonment or to pay a fine of 200 Dinars to have their prison sentences suspended. They all had the right to an appeal.