The following report was written by Samuel Morris on Bahrain and the Four Freedoms.
BAHRAIN AND THE FOUR FREEDOMS
The Kingdom of Bahrain is a
nation cherished by many for its multicultural heritage and abundance of warm, hospitable
people. The general perception is that the concept of democracy is a
quintessential aspiration in a Middle East
where democracy is the exception rather than the rule. However in the few
instances in which democracy is given its head (e.g. the experiments in Algeria and Palestine) the results often seem unpalatable
and are then undermined by an intolerant West. We would be the last to insist
on the concept that Bahrain
becomes truly democratic. Nevertheless, if we are to preserve the Bahrain we know
and have come to love, changes must be made to accommodate the aspirations of its
people. Therefore this report will focus on those reforms that would transform Bahrain, making it more sustainable as a Kingdom
and reduce levels of social turmoil which Bahrain has been subjected to for
years.
The notion of ‘human security’
rather than ‘national security’ is one that is too often ignored. President
Roosevelt’s four freedoms: Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Expression, Freedom
from Want, and Freedom from Fear, serve as the basis of this concept of human
security, and it is these four freedoms that this report focuses on in regard
to Bahrain.
Our understandings of
these freedoms, in relation to Bahrain, are as follow:
·
Freedom of Speech and Expression: This goes beyond
the freedom to talk and express oneself. It includes any act of seeking,
receiving and conveying information, regardless of the medium used, which
obviously includes the freedom of the press.
·
Freedom of Religion: The freedom of every person
to worship in his own way in equality with other religions and without persecution.
·
Freedom from Want: Freedom from hunger and
economic desperation, as individual freedom cannot truly exist without economic
security.
·
Freedom from Fear: Freedom to be able to live in
an environment where you neither expect arrest without trial, nor to be the
object of violent protest, nor of violent suppression of protest. An
environment where you are free from the fear of persecution for your beliefs or
views.
Between 2008 and 2010, Bahrain
improved its ranking in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index by eight
places. However, by 2011 it had slipped
22, ranking at 144 out of the 167 countries in the Index.
With general elections scheduled
to be held in 2014, the government of the Kingdom of Bahrain should redouble
efforts to reverse this decline through ongoing reforms in an attempt to make
those elections a time for celebration rather than conflict.
The Next Century Foundation
recommends that the 2014 elections be a target date for the government of
Bahrain to address its internal issues. The expedient implementation of the
findings of the BICI report would go a long way to ensuring this happens.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Article 22 of the Bahrain Constitution and legislative
framework provides for the freedom of an individual to profess one’s faith. However,
in practice limits have been placed on this freedom. Of a total population of 1,234,571,
there are 866,888 Muslims and the rest are a mix of Christians, Hindus, Jews and
Bahais.
These groups live and worship side-by-side, practicing their religion without
interference from the government or other religious groups. However, the Shi’a community claim to be
victims of systematic discrimination on religious grounds.
Bahrain
does not publish statistics on the sectarian breakdown of its citizens and Shi’ite
population estimates vary greatly. Tensions between these two groups (Shi’a and
Sunni) have resulted in socio-economic problems and limits being placed on the
extent to which the Shi’a may participate in government.
These tensions came to the fore and, combined with other political, social and
economic factors that cut across ethnic and sectarian lines, contributed to the
uprisings on 14th February 2011.
The NCF proposes four initiatives to begin to tackle the continuing
tensions:
1.
Avoid defining the conflict along
sectarian lines.
Most of those who participated in the uprisings over the
past year have been from the Shi’a community. This has led many to the view that
the conflict is sectarian. However, the conflict is not and has not been wholly
sectarian. The protests cut across both
religious and class divides; many problems exist outside the Shi’a-Sunni
framework.
Government officials and Bahrain
state television have repeatedly blamed Iran
for inciting the popular unrest (Iran’s agenda being to strengthen
Shi’a influence) but this is seen by the opposition as side-stepping and
belittling the real issues. They view it is an indication that the government
does not take their problems seriously. Although Bahrain
may legitimately feel threatened by Iran
and its aspirations to establish ascendency in the region, it is dangerous for
the Bahrain
government, through state television, to point the finger elsewhere rather than
address the issues within its own borders and amongst its own people.
The main opposition bloc and the leading opposition party,
al Wefaq, have often tried to avoid sectarian divisions, calling for Sunnis and
Shiites alike to ‘wave the flag of democracy’.
Even though al Wefaq is regarded as the moderate opposition, it must be
recognised that there are extremist threads in the complicated and
ever-shifting warp and weft of Bahrain’s political fabric. As the conflict has continued, more idealistic,
hard-line voices have emerged who have taken advantage of increasing anger on
the streets. This serves to emphasise
the need for a quick political resolution of the issues that divide the people
of Bahrain.
Another opposition faction that has attempted to avoid defining
the conflict along sectarian lines is Wa'ad, a secular leftist party whose
secretary-general Ebrahim Sharif has been in jail since April 2011. Wa'ad are
not particularly popular - all the popular forces today are Islamists, as elsewhere
- but they represent an important trend among intellectuals and business
people. They have a strong track record of campaigning against sectarianism.
Many Wa'ad politicians have married across the sectarian divide (including
Ebrahim Sharif, whose wife is a secular Shi’a).
Ebrahim Sharif has always called for reform under a
constitutional monarchy (as for that matter has Al Wefaq), and has been resolutely
against violence. A growing section of the opposition has been calling for a
republican option, as support for groups such as Al Wefaq declines. Large
swathes of those protesting are best described as the “silent opposition”. These
are individuals who are out on the street but are not affiliated with a
political party and go under the “February 14” banner. Most opposition groups
have to listen to these protestors or risk losing legitimacy.
Time is of the essence: the longer the resistance
continues, the louder the extreme voices will become. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain
must begin to strengthen the moderate, pragmatic groups among the opposition, and
stop defining the conflict along sectarian lines. It must acknowledge the fact
that there are some Sunnis in opposition to the government. If the conflict continues to increase its
sectarian nature, moderates in the opposition are likely to be forced to choose
sides, and invariably they will choose those the side they see as ‘their
own’. The moderate opposition would then
be lost.
2. Address the issue of citizenship within Bahrain.
The issue of citizenship has long been a contentious one. Less than half of Bahrain’s population are Bahraini
citizens due to the influx of migrants and guest-workers. There have been accusations that the Bahrain
government has practiced ethnic discrimination in regards to its policy of
granting citizenship i.e. attempting to favour Sunni over Shi’a during the
naturalization and citizenship processes.
A Bahrain
representative has argued that these were unfounded allegations, and that
between 2000-2010, as many as 11,000 Shi’as had gained citizenship,
yet through calculations of the difference between the actual rate of growth of
the number of citizens and the natural population growth rate since 2001 best
estimates are that 60,000 foreigners have been granted citizenship during this
period. The number of non-Shi’as being granted citizenship is therefore
comparatively high.
3. Address the demolition of Shi’ite mosques and places
of worship.
A number of Shi’ite places of worship have been demolished
by the government since the 14th February protests. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain
has not denied that these sites have been demolished, though it does dispute
the motive behind them. The BICI Report set the number of demolished places at
30 and the government of Bahrain
has unconditionally accepted this. The government claims that these buildings
were illegal and without the proper permits, but the timing and nature of the demolitions
calls this into question. The BICI
report acknowledges that only 5 out of 30 places of worship had requisite
building permits while also stating, “the Commission
notes with some concern the timing of demolition (1 March 2011 to 11 May 2011),
which relates it to events of February and March. The Government of Bahrain
must have been aware of the construction of these structures and that they
lacked proper legal permits and did not conform to building regulations.
Nonetheless, the Government of Bahrain had not stopped the construction of
these structures nor taken action to remove them for a number of years. The
Government should have realised that under the circumstances, in particular the
timing, the manner in which demolitions were conducted and the fact that these
were primarily Shia religious structures, the demolitions would be perceived as
a collective punishment and would therefore inflame the tension between the Government
of Bahrain and the Shia population.”
Fortunately, the Government suspended its action. However, the first week of December 2012 witnessed
the removal of some Shi’a mosques that were being reconstructed. And during the
Shi’a ceremony of Muharram in November 2012, the Interior Ministry jailed two
Shia preachers and summoned scores for interrogation on the religious content
of their speeches, something that has never happened before in Bahrain. There
is no clear evidence that the Government intended to punish the citizens
for their religious practises. However, the timing of such actions clearly
helped to inflame the situation.
In an attempt to
address this, on 22 May 2011, the King announced that new Shi’a places of
worship would be built. The BICI report also recommended ‘a follow up on the
King‘s statement to the effect that the Government of Bahrain will consider
rebuilding, at its expense, some of the demolished religious structures in
accordance with administrative regulations’. In section 1336, the Commission
welcomes the Government of Bahrain addressing this question at the earliest
possible time. A report by the Bahrain Centre of Human Rights, published on 26th
March 2012, claims that rebuilding has begun on five mosques. The report also claims that when residents
tried to rebuild the mosques themselves, they were prevented from doing so by
the authorities, citing the example of the Ameer Mohammed Mosque, which has
been rebuilt and demolished twice. The government of Bahrain claims that work has begun
on 12 places at a total cost of US$26 million and that actual construction work
has begun on five, while land has been fenced for the remaining seven on which
construction work is to be phased in. It
should be noted, however, that reconstruction has not necessarily taken place
on the sites of the existing mosques. Some of these places of worship were on
sites that have had religious significance (e.g. burial sites) for over 200
years and were built because of the religious significance of the site.
Although some of the building may have been without the
proper permits and thus been deemed illegal, the demolition of Shi’ite places
of worship is perceived by the Shi’a community as persecution and fuels both resentment
and violent backlashes. It also further
radicalises the opposition and diminishes their desire for dialogue. The issue of the sanctity of religious
places is supremely sensitive, and by not working more quickly and with more
dedication to reverse the damage done, the government will only foster greater
division between itself and Bahrain’s
Shi’a community.
4. Remove laws and conventions that deliberately prevent
Shi’ites from gaining influence.
Although there have been great improvements in the openness
of Bahrain’s
politics, there are still areas which need improvement. There are several
practises in Bahrain’s
politics that deliberately prevent or restrict Shi’a participation in the governance
of Bahrain,
thus leaving them politically disenfranchised.
In the 2010 elections, although Al Wefaq won only 18 out of the 40 of
the seats in the Council of Deputies, they garnered a majority of the votes. Thus, despite gaining more than 50% of the votes, they only won 45% of the
available seats.
The geographic boundaries of constituencies in Bahrain
are mapped out along ethnic lines to establish political advantage. The number of voters in each voting district
varies greatly, from 12,000 to 500, which of course is seen as a deliberate
attempt to restrict the number of seats Shi’ite political parties are likely to
win. Because Bahrain in any case has a bicameral
system with a government appointed by the King rather than by parliament, the manipulation
of constituency size to this degree is unnecessary to guarantee the survival of
the monarchy. The practice should be abandoned. The districting issue has been
put on the negotiation table as part of the National Dialogue.
A further issue is that of election monitoring. Though observers from Bahrain’s
non-governmental organisations, independent political and civil societies
groups regularly monitor elections, international observers are barred. This is
not to say that Bahrain’s
election results should be called into question, but international election
monitors should be allowed access to comply with international best practice. These issues should certainly be addressed
before the 2014 elections.
5. Both the opposition and the government should make
stronger commitment to dialogue
Having attained
positions in parliament, opposition groups should utilise this key forum,
particularly since a parliamentary majority could obtain a legislative veto.
Al Wefaq needs to find a credible way to re-engage in the parliamentary
political process and the government needs to help facilitate this. To
encourage Al Wefaq to re-engage serious concessions should be made by the
government. Stepping back into the National Assembly without such concessions could
be political suicide. If nothing is done and the situation continues to become
more polarised, Al Wefaq may lose its popularity in the street and find itself
pushed aside as hard-line opposition voices grow louder.
All opposition
parties should also take part in the National Dialogue. If the National
Dialogue meetings are to be successful and credible, the full spectrum of Bahrain’s
political views should be present. To encourage opposition groups to a take
part in such dialogue, bilateral meetings should also be organised to take
place alongside the National Dialogue between the opposition (i.e. only the
opposition not the pro-government parties) and the government. This would build
confidence on the part of opposition groups and guarantee that their legitimate
grievances are being heard. It should however
be noted that a number of opposition members are in prison and therefore cannot
attend any National Dialogue.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political rights
states that "everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print,
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice". Of course, total freedom of expression does
not exist absolutely in any country, but freedom of expression remains an essential
part of society, especially one as diverse as Bahrain. Suppression of the ideas and desires of any
group in a society inevitably leads to the radicalisation of those who feel
stifled. If they are not able to express themselves in words they will do so in
actions.
The Government of Bahrain
declared a three month state of emergency and banned protests to “maintain
security” and safeguard “civil peace” in March 2011. The government claimed
that demonstrators had threatened “national security” by calling for the
overthrow of the government. Protests have now once again been banned,
this time just before the beginning of Muharram, which has effectively created
a situation of Marshall Law.
The NCF recommends three
initiatives:
1. Enforce constitutional protections guaranteeing freedom of
expression and of the press.
Articles 23 and 24 of the constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain
guarantee freedom of expression, both in terms of opinion and the press. In order for the people of the Kingdom of Bahrain to have confidence in the
integrity of the government and its promises, guarantees must be given. Any
form of suppression of press freedom is counterproductive and therefore serves
no useful purpose. Indeed, greater press freedom might act as a safety valve,
actually reducing tension.
2. Address the treatment of opposition members.
Since February 14th, opposition members and activists have
been imprisoned without trial and there have been reports of torture and death
in custody. The ICRC has been in country since January 2012, freely visiting
police stations, temporary detention facilities, jails and detainees. However
restrictions have been placed on human rights organisations such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch.
Though the government has agreed to retry key opposition leaders, many
have not been released. Even after dropping charges for 328 people, relating to
freedom of speech, some remain incarcerated for their participation in meetings
and rallies challenging the monarchy.
Bahrain has extended a crackdown on the opposition by revoking 31 activists
nationalities claiming that they damaged national security. Some may perceive these actions as being a policy driven in
retaliation for the unrest last year.
In order for national dialogue to work, the government
must convince the opposition of their integrity. Imprisoning opposition members and activists,
often in the absence of due process of law, will only damage the government’s
credibility.
A true
culture of freedom of expression will require that the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain sets a better example. Perhaps
the best start that could be made would be the reform of State TV.
The Human Development Index, as included in the 2011 UNDP Human
Development Report, ranked Bahrain
42nd out of 187 countries with comparable data. This would suggest a high level of
well-being, especially when compared to other Arab countries in the region. However,
disparities in wealth are patent. The
poorest neighbourhoods of Manama
and the most underdeveloped villages of the island are, for the most part, inhabited
by the Shi’a community. In 2010 unemployment figures were reported as
just 3.7%, which shows an increase in employment through a global recession.
However, a particular worry is that Shi’a citizens are underrepresented in the
higher tiers of many public sector jobs.
This leads to accusations that the government favours non-Shi’a.
After the protests of 14th February, the Bahrain Independent
Commission of Inquiry (BICI) reported 1,624 complaints from people alleging
they had been fired or suspended from their jobs over the protests. Many of these were from the Shi’a community.
However, claims have been made that all 1,624 have been given the opportunity
to be reinstated.
Socio-economic inequality is an issue that can ferment resentment in
any society. Creating a more defined ‘us versus them’ framework will only boost
fundamentalist and hard-line voices within the opposition. The government of
the Kingdom of Bahrain
must address the socio-economic inequalities that exist within Bahrain’s borders
in order to tackle any further frustration and unrest.
The government still invests heavily in its public relations
in Washington and London, so evidently cares greatly about its
political and economic relations with these key Western capitals. The unrest in
Bahrain has strained the
country's relations with its traditional friends in the US and UK,
who face criticism at home over their ties with Bahrain.
An ongoing uprising in the nation will only put further
strain on an already hard-hit economy and strategic relationships in the West.
It is in the best interest of the government to stem the island nation’s
economic troubles as this will help bring a quick and peaceful resolution to
the unrest.
Through the publication of the BICI report the Kingdom of
Bahrain have been using international best practice to address the problems
that occurred and ways for Bahrain to move forward. The reforms being made are
ongoing and are being produced in legislative form. However, without the full
implementation of the reforms such legislation only acts as a facade.
FREEDOM OF FEAR
In Bahrain, freedom from fear is
inextricably linked to freedom of religion and of expression. Trust in the government is the cornerstone
for any successful and legitimate state, and if the government of the Kingdom
of Bahrain wishes to see progress in terms of national dialogue and an end to
unrest, they must increase the confidence of their citizens in their own security
forces in order to pre-empt any tension that might arise in the run up to the
2014 elections.
The NCF recommends two principal
proposals:
1. Ensure that the security
forces reform their practices.
Incidents of police brutality towards those in custody have
significantly reduced but instances still occur. The tactics of security forces
should always be open to reform. Social media and networking sites are showing
footage of violence on both sides of the conflict, but it is the tactics of the
security forces that have attracted the most attention and criticism. BICI found that the security forces were
responsible for thirteen civilian deaths that occurred during the protests, and
even goes on to describe the violent causes of these deaths. It should be noted
that the BICI report only looks at a three month window during 2011, and that
further deaths have occurred since. The
commission also reported deaths due to torture in police custody, and many deaths
that occurred after the protests were due to the inhalation of tear gas.
Furthermore, the commission found that ‘Bahrain security forces
systematically raided houses in order to arrest individuals, and in so doing
terrified the occupants. The security forces intentionally broke down doors,
forced entry and sometimes ransacked the houses. This practice was often
accompanied by sectarian insults and verbal abuse.’
The excessive force used by the Bahrain security forces must be
thoroughly addressed if there is to be any hope of rebuilding the trust so
crucially needed between citizen and state.
The government must now abide by its own rule of law and maintain the
principle that no one is above the law, even and especially those in all
hierarchies of the security forces. The
government of the Kingdom
of Bahrain must continue
to implement the BICI recommendations that there should be full investigations
into any reports of torture, murder and harassment by security forces. The implementation of accountability
measures such as the appointment of a Ministry of Interior Ombudsman are steps
in the right direction but are by no means of themselves sufficient.
The Bahrain
government have recently made restitutions of $6.2 million (BD 2,340,000) to be
paid to 39 families over the deaths of 39 relatives.
This is a significant confidence building exercise by the state, however
financial restitutions will have to be matched with sincere reforms.
Chief author
of the BICI report, Cherif Bassiouni, has been critical of the reform process.
He stated that progress had been made but the reform process has stagnated. In
relation to reforms in the security services he stated: “If you have
approximately 200 cases and you refer only nine cases to trial in a period of a
year and you have one conviction, it doesn’t seem to be a satisfactory result.”
2.
Consider further clemency for medical professionals and guarantee the
provision of adequate healthcare to all.
Since February 2011, 95 medics have been detained by
security forces. Although the behaviour of some of the medical professionals
was difficult to reconcile with the exercise of their medical responsibilities,
some of the allegations against them were unfounded.
Furthermore, a report by Physicians for Human Rights accuses the government of
politicising and militarising the health system, claiming that the Government
of Bahrain has denied a large segment of the population safe access to
impartial medical care, resulting in widespread fear among civilians seeking
medical treatment.
For
the Kingdom of Bahrain, time is of the essence. The longer the current wave of unrest continues
and the more isolated the opposition is from the government, the more
radicalised the opposition will become. And
the more radicalised the opposition becomes, the more desperate the government will
become. Syria serves as an awful reminder
of how this security dilemma can spiral out of control. There have been calls for reform but without
sincere steps towards negotiated reforms the situation will undoubtedly
deteriorate.
If the government do not act fast, they are in danger of
marginalising the moderate opposition and strengthening the extremist
opposition. Political
stagnation means that all parties will refuse to compromise, and without
compromise there will be no dialogue, national reconciliation or a consensual
political settlement on the horizon. The prospect of Gulf unity could further frighten the opposition as such
a union appears to shore up Sunni power on the Gulf. The Bahrain opposition, in despair,
might resort to more desperate tactics, possibly even to violence. The current political stagnation in Bahrain
needs to be addressed as it is negatively impacting all political, social and
economic aspects of public life. All parties should accept the principle of
consensus as a basic element in alleviating the problem.
If resistance goes on and
the youth movement become more and more politicised, the opposition’s vision
for the future will leave less and less room for negotiation. The
government of the Kingdom of Bahrain must act fast, to ensure that the
political situation is resolved in time for the 2014 elections.
[Ends]
Restrictions on public
demonstrations and other public gatherings were introduced on 30 October 2012. Bahrain said
the ban was a temporary step.
Key figures such as Nabeel Rejab, and Zainab and Abdulhadi
al-Khawaja attracted international attention at their arrest. Nabeel Rejab is
serving a three year sentence and claims to be held in solitary confinement. Abdulhadi
al-Khawaja is currently serving a life sentence after being arrested in April
2011 for his activity as a protest organiser. His daughter Zainab al-Khawaja
has been repeatedly arrested.
On 7 November2012, Bahrain decided
to revoke the nationality of 31 citizens for 'having undermined state
security'. The decision violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
men include London-based dissident Saeed al-Shehabi.
As Cherif Bassiouni himself recently stated: “A
number of recommendations on accountability were either not implemented or
implemented only half-heartedly.”
These victims include all 35 deaths described in the BICI report as
well as 4 deaths – three civilians and one police – that followed the events.
Three compensation mechanisms have been established to make these
restitutions however there are now details given on two of the mechanisms and
the third has been effectively stopped by Royal Decree.
Twenty medical professionals who were involved in the
2011 protests were sentenced to prison terms (Dr Ali al-Ekry was sentenced to
15 years in prison on more than a dozen charges; the remaining 19
doctors/medical workers received lesser prison sentences). They were accused of
crimes against the state which included inciting hatred, occupying Salmaniya Hospital, and attempting to overthrow
the Government. A further 28 medical
workers faced misdemeanour charges. Of the
48 accused, 47 were Shi’a. Following a recent trial verdict,
only two of the defendants now face comparatively long prison terms. They
should be treated with clemency. Then on
21 November 2012, 23 medics were sentenced to 3 months imprisonment or to pay a
fine of 200 Dinars to have their prison sentences suspended. They all had the
right to an appeal.
